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Abstract - Consider an income distribution among households of the same size in which individuals, equally 
needy from the point of view of an ethical observer, are treated unfairly within the household. In the first part 
of the paper, we look for necessary and sufficient conditions under which the Generalized Lorenz test is 
preserved from household to individual level. We find that the concavity of the expenditures devoted to 
public goods relatively to household income is a necessary condition. This condition also becomes sufficient, 
if joined with the concavity of the expenditure devoted to private goods of the dominated individual. The 
results are extended to the case of heterogeneous populations, when more complex Lorenz comparisons are 
involved. In the second part of the paper, we propose a new method to identify the intra-family sharing rule. 
The double concavity condition is then non-parametrically tested on French households. 
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Recent literature emphasizes the importance of omitting intra-household inequality in nor-
mative analysis. Haddad and Kanbur (1990) ﬁnd that when an additive inequality index is
used to measure the level of inequality inside a population, then a serious downward bias
appears because intra-household inequality is omitted. Taking into account intra-household
inequality in normative analysis would be straightforward if individual’s welfare was directly
observed. Unfortunately this is not the case as incomes and consumptions are generally
collected at the household level, moreover economies of scales need to be controlled whien
comparing households of diﬀerent sizes.
In this paper, we question whether or not Lorenz-type comparisons are biased when
ignoring the eﬀect of intra-household inequality. If households (homogeneous in their com-
position) shared equally their resources, then it would be suﬃcient to resort to Lorenz
dominance at the household level in order to compare inequality and welfare at the individ-
ual level. Peluso and Trannoy (2004) show th a tw em a ye n l a r g et h ev a l i d i t yo fs o m ev e r y
well known criteria of dominance of the Lorenz type beyond the strict case of pure equal-
ity between members of the household. Their starting point is that although individuals
have the same needs from the point of view of an ethical observer, each household contains
dominant individuals, advantaged in their private consumption with respect to dominated
individuals. Under this assumption, Lorenz comparisons between households are meaningful
to the analysis of inter-individual inequality if and only if the part of private expenditure
devoted to the dominated individuals remains a constant share of the household income.
This part must represent a concave function of household income whether we are interested
in the comparisons brought by the Generalized Lorenz test (Shorrocks (1983)), which mixes
both the size and the distribution dimensions in the appraisal of welfare.
These results, albeit interesting, do not fully allow us to test empirically the sensibility of
the main assumptions. One important aspect has not been taken into account in the previous
work: the presence of family public goods. It is well accepted that individuals living together
generate public consumption of goods, altruism and externalities and the impact of these
1phenomena on the individual well-being cannot be dismissed. We assume here both intra-
household public consumption of goods and a form of discrimination in each household. We
adopt a non-structural model of the household, where the deﬁnition of individual income
is justiﬁed by a large ﬂexibility of individual preferences across diﬀerent situations. This
is consistent with our empirical analysis, based on some limited assumption on individual
tastes. We ﬁnd two necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the preservation of the Generalized
Lorenz test at the individual level: the concavity of the part of expenditures devoted to
public good relatively to household income, and the concavity of the individual income of
the dominated individual. The richer the household is, the lesser the part devoted to public
good must be. A suﬃcient condition is then proposed in terms of concavity of two sharing
functions: a public sharing function, expressing the expenditure in public goods as a function
of the household income, and a private sharing function, indicating the private expenditure
of the disadvantaged individual as a function of the total sum devoted in private goods in
the household. These assumptions mean that poorest households are the more egalitarian
too. A testable interpretation could be that when a household becomes richer, the share
of global income used for personal expenditures becomes more and more important, and
the individual with the strongest bargaining power within the household takes the highest
advantage.
A further extension encompasses the diversity of the population. The mentioned results
concern a population homogeneous regarding the size and the composition of the households.
It is diﬃcult to maintain such an assumption in any empirical investigation, where the
diﬀerences of individuals choice across family status often provide sources of identiﬁcation.
Here, to make things simple, but w.l.o.g, we consider populations composed of couples and
singles. In this case, the appropriate criteria for welfare comparisons are a test pointed out
by Bourguignon (1989) or the Sequential Generalized Lorenz test, proposed by Atkinson and
Bourguignon (1987). The ﬁrst criterion is based on the assumption that the marginal utility
of an euro received by a couple is higher than the marginal utility of an euro received by a
single individual. The Atkinson and Bourguignon test also assumes that this diﬀerence of
marginal utility becomes less and less relevant when income increases. These assumptions
2may be translated in terms transfer principles: respectively, the social welfare is increased
when a single makes a transfer of income in favor of a couple with less income, and the social
welfare increases all the more as progressive transfers are performed among couples rather
than among singles, others things being equal.
We exhibit conditions on intra-household distribution which convert the Bourguignon
(1989) dominance criterion among homogeneous households into the Generalized Lorenz
dominance at the level of individuals. We also show that it is impossible, in general, to
produce a similar result for the Sequential Generalized dominance test, which consequently
results unappealing when intra-househod discrimination is a relevant phenomenon.
These conditions may be served as testable restrictions in an econometric analysis. Using
the French Household Expenditure Survey Data (FHES Enquête Budget des Familles, year
2000), we estimate non-parametrically the intra-family share of income devoted to public
good as well as the share of the dominated individual. Our identiﬁcation strategy is to
assume that single individuals and members of couples of the same sex have the same taste
just for an assignable good: here we consider clothes. A double concavity test is then
implemented by checking the sign of the second derivatives of the sharing rule with respect to
household’s income. In this analysis, the eﬀects of individual heterogeneity and diﬀerence in
the wage rates on the sharing functions are not controlled. From a strict empirical viewpoint,
this allows to maintain good small sample properties of the non-parametric estimator. In a
normative economics perspective, there are two main justiﬁcations for this.
The ﬁrst factors is related to needs. One may presume that diﬀerent individuals may
present diﬀerent needs, which should be taken into account by the ethical observer. For
example, if you are taller than your partner, you may have some claim for a higher share in
food expenditures. In Western countries, food expenditures do no represent more than 20 %
of the household budget, a diﬀerence of 20% in calorie need may vindicated a diﬀerence of
4% of the share in private expenditure, which admittedly belongs in the error margin. We
conclude that our assumption of identical claim to the resources from a need perspective is
a sensible assumption in a developed country like France.
The second justiﬁcation is related to the notion of merit or talent. If a higher wage
3rate strictly reﬂects a higher marginal productivity of the individual, its eﬀect on the intra-
household sharing rule should not be controlled by the ethical observer. Diﬀerent philosophi-
cal points of view have been defended regarding the pros and cons of claims on a bigger share
of resources based on a higher talent. Here we suppose that the ethical observer does not
s u p p o r tt h ev i e wt h a tt h em a r k e tw a g er a t eh a ss o m e t h i n gt od ow i t ht h ei n t r a - h o u s e h o l d
distribution of resources.Based on that premise, we deduce that it is correct not to control
in the estimation analysis of the sharing function for diﬀerences between the two partners in
market wage rates.
In Section 2 we sketch the model and prove the results about the link between the welfare
comparisons among homogeneous households and among individuals. In Section 3 we study
the case with heterogeneous households. In Section 4 we present the empirical study. We
discuss further extensions and possible developments in the concluding Section 5. Tables
and proofs are collected in the Appendix.
2 The model and welfare analysis
2.1 Homogeneous households
We focus on a population composed of n couples (indexed by i =1 ,...,n, with n ≥ 2)w h i c h
diﬀer in their income levels. Let Yc designate a generic vector of couples’ income, rearranged















The welfare quasi-order in which we are interested is the Generalized Lorenz criterion
(GL) (Shorrocks (1983)). For the sake of completeness, we recall it.
Deﬁnition 1 GL dominance. Given Yc,Y
c0∈Yn,














i for k =1 ,..,n.
4T h ei d e at h a ta l lhomogeneous agents have same needs is translated, in the ‘dominance
approach’ to inequality, by evaluating the well-being guaranteed by an income to any in-
dividual through the same utility function. The GL test has an interpretation in terms of
welfare comparisons. An individual income distribution y dominates y0 according to the GL









for all the class of non-decreasing and concave utility functions u. This standard result on
welfare ranking is completed by a principle of transfers: y <GL y0 if and only if y can
be obtained from y0 by a ﬁnite sequence of progressive transfers (also named Pigou-Dalton
transfers)o rincrements.1
2.2 The sharing functions approach
The household model adopted here may be seen as the representation of intra-household
behavior formulated by an ‘ethical observer’, which takes into account two main features:
some degree of cooperation among the members of the couple, and, at the same time, a kind of
intra-household discrimination. We adopt a non-structural model: the expenditure patterns
relevant for welfare analysis are expressed in a reduced form , and no utility functions are
used to explain behavior.
The cooperative aspect is described by assuming a complete agreement in the couple on
the expenditure for pure public goods. Let Yi be the income of household i, we designate the
public sharing function g : R+ → R+ as the part of the household budget devoted to public
goods. This allows to control for altruistic attitudes and positive externalities within the
family. We assume that g is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, identical across households
and respects the following properties: g(0) = 0,g (Yi) ≤ Yi and g0(Yi) ∈ [0,1],∀Yi ≥ 0. We
exclude the case where public consumption decreases with income and expenditures exceed-
ing income. The remaining part of household income: Yi−g(Yi) (henceforth denoted by ˜ Yi)
1A progressive tranfer is an income transfer from a rich to a poor, its magnitude can at most reverse the
initial positions. An increment is just a gift received by an individual. For a proof of the result cited above
see Marshall and Olkin, (1979), C.6, p. 28 and A.9.a, p. 123.
5is shared among the dominant and the dominated individual for their private consumption.
The dominated individual receives at most an amount equal to that allowed to the dominant
one. The amount pi = fp(˜ Yi) received by the dominated individual in household i is deﬁned
here private sharing function and designated by fp : R+ → R+.2 The function fp : R+→ R+
is assumed identical across households, twice continuously diﬀerentiable, non-decreasing,
with fp(0) = 0 and fp(x) ≤
1
2
x, ∀x ∈ R+.
The amount ri of private expenditure of the dominant type is ri = fr(˜ Yi)=˜ Yi − fp(˜ Yi).
Whether the normative analysis concerns households − and variations in saving and
prices are omitted − one may equivalently consider income or consumption for welfare com-
parisons (see Deaton and Zaidi (2002)). Whether the analysis focuses on individuals, and
public consumption is neglected, a simple deﬁnition of individual income naturally emerges
as the part of the household budget devoted to each household member to her (or his) pri-
vate expenditure. In the presence of public consumption, no obvious deﬁnition comes out
without additional assumptions. In an abstract way, the ‘real’ individual income yij sum-
marizes in the household i the contribution of expenditure for public and private goods to











I nt h ef o l l o w i n g ,w ed e n o t eyij the individualized income of an individual of type j living in
the couple i. It corresponds to the amount of money necessary for an individual living single
t ob u ye x a c t l yt h es a m eb u n d l eo fg o o d sa si fh ew a si nac o u p l e .H e n c ei ti st h es u mo ft h e
public and the private sharing functions.









if j is a dominated type
g(Yi)+fr(˜ Yi) if j is a dominant type.
(2)
2The sharing function approach presented here couldb es e e na st h er e d u c e df o r mo fas t r u c t u r a lm o d e l
of the household, in which the private consumption decision is taken conditional to a given level of public
expenditrues (see for instance Chiappori, Blundell and Meghir (2002)).
6A careful reader may notice that this deﬁnition of individual equivalent income does not
take into account the eventual change in consumption behaviour that may occur for one
individual accross diﬀerent cohabitational status. For example, it is assumed that a divorced
individual would continue to pay the same mortgage than if married. Hence the individual
equivalent income, as deﬁned here, may sometimes induce diﬀerent utility levels for one
individual accross diﬀerent cohabitational status. Purely, it corresponds to the normative
view of the ethical observer who does not anticipate the change in the consumption pattern
accross marital status. A main advantage of this deﬁnition is that it does not require any
structural modelisation of individual behaviour, which is usually not required in normative
economics. Figure 1 describes the goods consumed by a household member: the vertical axe
z indicates a Hicksian good (with unitary price) summarizing private consumption and G is
t h eq u a n t i t yo fp u b l i cg o o d ,w i t ham a r k e tp r i c ep (' 2 in the ﬁgure). We suppose that the
couple follows an eﬃcient scheme of contribution for the public good. More precisely, the
quantity G0 of public good is chosen through a Lindhal equilibrium. The bundle (G0,z 0)
then represents the consumption of an individual living in a couple at the equilibrium. The
shape of his (her) indiﬀerence curve at (G0,z 0) is the Lindhal price pL of G for this person.
By deﬁnition pL ≤ p and if we sum the Lindhal prices of both individuals we get p. One one
hand, we exclude here free riding as any other source of ineﬃciency. On the other hand, intra-
household discrimination may aﬀect Lindhal prices, in the sense that individual preferences
in the household may be conditioned by social factors. In the simpliﬁed model presented
here, the individual income (2) deﬁned above corresponds to pG0 + z0,that is the income






E(p, U (G0, z0)) 
U (G0, z0) 
pL G0+z0 x0 
Figure 1: The deﬁnition of individualized income in a couple
Diﬀerent deﬁnitions could be provided by introducing additional information about pref-
erences. For instance, if we admit that individual preferences are invariant w.r.t. marital
status,3 we may deﬁne the individual equivalent income E(p,U(G0,z 0)) as the income needed
by a single to achieve the same utility level than if he was in a couple, which is reached in
(G0,z 0).A si ta p p e a r si nt h eﬁgure 1, the individual equivalent income E(p,U(G0,z 0)) is in
general lower than individual income pG0+z0.T h ed e ﬁnition of individual equivalent income
approaches that of individual income (2) when a large ﬂexibility of preferences is allowed.
In order to clarify this point, observe that a diﬀerent marital status generates two distinct
eﬀects. On one hand, individual preferences may change, in a non-speciﬁed way. On the
other hand, to pass from the status of "married" to that of "single" entails a further eﬀect
on the price of the ‘public’ good, which rises from pL to p. This price variation generates
a substitution eﬀect reducing the desired quantity ofp u b l i cg o o d . I fw ed on o tp o s ea n y
restriction on the domain of admissible preferences, the ﬁnal result on the quantity of public
3Pollak (1991) designates the study of the choices of the same type of individual across diﬀerent price-
demographic situations as situation comparisons.
8good of both eﬀect is ambiguous. In the ﬁgure 2, we show two opposite cases.
E(p, U’’ (G0, z0))
(G0, z0) 
z
U’’ (G0, z0) 
   ( G’’1, z’’1) 
     pG0+ z0
E(p,U’ (G0, z0)) 
    (G0, z0)
z 
U (G0, z0)
                (G’1, z’1) 
      pG0+ z0 
G G
a  b 
U’ (G0, z0)
U (G0, z0)
Figure 2: Heterogeneity of preferences across marital status
Single’s preferences are represented by hatched indiﬀerent curves passing through (G0,z 0)),
while the continuous indiﬀerence curves belong to an individual living in couple. In panel a),
the change in preferences modiﬁes the choice in the same direction as the substitution eﬀect.
In panel b), the change in preferences is in the opposite direction than the substitution eﬀect,
and its magnitude is so high that the substitution eﬀect is more than compensated. The
quantity of public good G00
1 c h o s e nb yas i n g l ei nt h i sc a s ei sh i g h e rt h a nG0.4 g
The relevant point for our analysis is that for any quasi-convex preferences Us,i no r d e r
to achieve the utility level Us(G0,z 0), t h es i n g l ec h o o s e sab u n d l ea tm o s ta se x p a n s i v ea s
(G0,z 0). Formally, if we designate by Us the class of the quasi-concave individual utility
functions, the following remark holds.
Remark 1 pG0 + z0 = Max(E(p,Us(G0,z 0)), for all Us ∈ Us.
4The ﬁrst situation means that the MRS of private to public goods is higher for individuals that live in
a household. This is a plausible assumption, but not necessary in this paper. The case b) represents the
opposite case, plausible for some kind of "public goods". For instance, if single individuals watch more TV
than married men with their wives.
9We can conclude that deﬁnition of individual income (2) naturally arises from the idea
of individual equivalent income, whenever some sort of ﬂexibility of tastes is allowed across
marital status.
2.3 Welfare analysis: from couples to individuals
The preservation of the generalized Lorenz ranking means that an improvement in the distri-
bution of household income distribution in the sense of the generalized Lorenz test generates
a similar improvement in the distribution of individual incomes. The concavity of the sharing
functions g and fp guarantees that welfare and inequality tests performed on households’
incomes distributions are informative about the pattern of welfare and inequality at the
individual level. We ﬁrst establish a necessary and suﬃcient condition
Theorem 1 The two following conditions are equivalent:
i) g and yp are concave functions
ii) for all Y,Y0 ∈ Yn,Y <GL Y0 ⇒ y <GL y0.
Proof. i)= ⇒ ii) Suppose that g and yp are non-decreasing and concave and consider














for all u non-decreasing and concave, which is equivalent to y <GL y0. For a given individual
utility function u,w ed e n o t ew the sum of individual utilities in the household i,t h a ti s
w(Yi)=u(yip)+u(yir).W eo m i tt h ei n d e xi a n du s i n gt h ef a c tt h a ta l lf u n c t i o n sa r et w i c e
diﬀerentiable, we prove an intermediate result.
Step 1 If g and yp are concave functions, then w0(Y ) ≥ 0 and w00(Y ) ≤ 0, ∀Y ≥ 0.5
w0(Y )=u0(yp)[g0(Y )+f0
p(˜ Y )(1 − g0(Y ))] + u0(yr)[g0(Y )+f0
r(˜ Y )(1 − g0(Y ))]. Since 0 ≤
g0(Y ) ≤ 1, it is easy to see that this expression is non-negative. From y0
p(Y )=g0(Y )+
f0
p(˜ Y )(1 − g0(Y )) and y0
r(Y )=g0(Y )+f0















5See Peluso and Trannoy (2004) for a diﬀerent proof in the non diﬀerentiable case without public goods.



















r(˜ Y )] (4)
T w os i t u a t i o n sh a v et ob ec o n s i d e r e d .
First case. Consider the part of the domain where f00
p is positive. Then u0(yp)y00
p(Y ) is
non-positive due to the assumption y00












This expression is non-positive, proving the result.
Second case f00
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Due to the concavity of u,this expression is non-positive and we may conclude that w00(Y ) ≤
0.



















The reasoning is valid for all u non-decreasing and concave and the suﬃciency part is proved.
ii)= ⇒ i) Now we show that the concavity of g and yp is necessary to get w(Yi)=u(yip)+










for all u non-decreasing and concave (the
preservation of GL to individuals). The proof is given by contradiction: we show that if g
or yp are not concave, then there exists a non-decreasing and concave utility function such
that w00(Yi) > 0. Starting again from the expression (3), we ﬁrst observe that, whenever
y00
p > 0, by choosing an angle utility function u(y)=m i n ( ky,z) with a shape k such that
kyp <z<k y r, we obtain w00(Y ) > 0.
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It is clear that, if g00 > 0, by adding a term ky to any non-decreasing and concave utility
function u, for a k suﬃciently large it results w00(Y ) > 0.
Whenever g and fp are non-decreasing and concave, the same properties hold for yp and
we may express a suﬃcient condition in terms of the sharing functions.
Corollary 1 If g and fp are increasing and concave, then, for all Y,Y0 ∈ Yn
Y <GL Y
0 ⇒ y <GL y
0.
The previous corollary provides restrictions on individual choices that are the basis of
our empirical analysis.
3 Extension to a population of singles and couples
3.1 Heterogeneous households
The welfare analysis developed in the previous section is now extended to a population
composed of n couples (always indexed by i =1 ,...,n,with n ≥ 2 )a n dm singles (indexed
by j =1 ,...,m with n ≥ 2 ). Let ys designate a generic income vector for single individuals,




















+ |Y1 ≤ Y2... ≤ Ym+n
ª
.
12Given Y ∈Yn+m, the corresponding vector of individual i n c o m e si sd e n o t e dy =( ys,yc).T o
save notations, j will serve as an index for individuals as well. The set of feasible distributions





+ | y1 ≤ y2 ≤ .. ≤ y2n+m
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.
Observe that y contains the incomes of singles and the incomes of individuals living in a
couple adjusted for public goods as deﬁned in (2). We now strengthen the properties of g
by introducing a further ‘regularity’ condition.
To investigate the inheritance of GL test from households to individuals is a pointless
exercise whenever households have diﬀerent needs, since the GL criterion becomes inap-
propriate for welfare comparisons. We then focus our attention on the dominance criteria
proposed by Bourguignon (1989) and by Atkinson and Bourguignon (1987) (henceforth B
and AB, respectively).
Assumption 1 Let ucand u be twice diﬀerentiable, non-decreasing and concave functions
representing the utility of a couple and of an individual, respectively. We consider the fol-
lowing cases:
¯ B) uc0(z) − u0(z) ≥ 0 for all z ≥ 0
AB) uc0(z) − u0(z) ≥ 0 and uc00(z) − u00(z) ≤ 0, for all z ≥ 0.
Under the assumption ¯ B, the diﬀerence between the utility functions of a couple and a
single individual, for a given income, is a non-decreasing function. This diﬀerence becomes
non-decreasing and concave under the assumption AB. The B and AB social dominance
criteria are the following
Deﬁnition 2 Given Y,Y0 ∈ Yn+m,






















for all utility functions uc and u satisfying the condition ¯ B (AB).
13The test associated to the AB dominance criterion is named sequential generalized Lorenz
test and it is easy to implement: “take ﬁrst the most deserving group, then add the next
most deserving group and so on, until all groups are included, checking at each stage for GL
dominance. If this obtains, one distribution can be recommended over the other” (Lambert
(1993), p. 86). The Bourguignon criteria also is equivalent to an implementable algorithm,
based on the Foster and Shorrocks’ (1988) idea that the ‘poverty gap’ is always lower in the
dominant distribution, whatever poverty limit that is chosen. Bourguignon criterion allows
for diﬀerent poverty limits among types of households, but imposing that the poverty limits
are non-decreasing with needs.
It will be useful to recall the transfer criteria associated with these concepts of social
dominance. Ebert (2000) clariﬁed this topic: for an ethical observer that follows the B
dominance criterion, the social welfare improves after increments, progressive transfers within
groups and after progressive transfer between groups, that is any progressive transfers from
a less deserving household to a needier one. If the normative criterion implemented by
the decision maker is the AB one, then a further principle has to be added, the so called
principle of diminishing transfers between groups. It is described by Ebert (2000) as follows:
“A progressive transfer changing two given income levels within a subpopulation is relatively
more desirable the needier the respective subpopulation”.
3.2 Welfare analysis: from heterogeneous households to individu-
als
In this part of the paper we explore the possibility of the conversion of the welfare criteria for
heterogeneous households into GL dominance among individuals. We show a positive result
and a negative one. The dominance in the B sense among heterogeneous households implies
GL dominance at individual level, but a similar result does not hold for the AB sequential
test.
                  Co ro l l a r y 2 Ifg andy p are concave, then for all Y,Y0 ∈ Yn+m
Y <B Y
0
=⇒ y <GL y
0.
14Proof. We show that
[fp and yp concave]= ⇒
£
not y <GL y =⇒ not Y <B Y
0¤
.
Suppose that y <GL y0 does not hold. Then there exists a non-decreasing and concave































which turns to be equivalent to:
Pn











where ˜ uc(Y c
i )=˜ u(fp(Y c
i )) + ˜ u(fr(Y c
i )). If yp and g are concave, by using diﬀerentiability
and reasoning as in the proof of Theorem 1 we know that ˜ uc is non-decreasing and concave.
Moreover, since ˜ uc0(Y )=˜ u0(yp)[g0(Y )+f0
p(˜ Y )(1−g0(Y ))]+ ˜ u0(yr)[g0(Y )+f0
r(˜ Y )(1−g0(Y ))],
it is a weigthed mean of ˜ u0(yp) and ˜ u0(yr) and it is easy to see that ˜ uc0(Y ) ≥ ˜ u0(Y ) ∀Y ≥ 0.
Then ˜ uc may be interpreted as a non-decreasing and concave household utility function
satisfying Assumption ¯ B. By comparing (5) and (6), we conclude that Y <B Y
0 is negated.
This result is in line with the principle of progressive transfers among groups mentioned
above, since a progressive transfer from a single to a couple generates a pair of progressive
transfers among individuals.
Ar e s u l ts i m i l a rt oP r o p o s i t i o n2c a n n o tb eg u a r a n t e e df o rt h eA Bc r i t e r i o n ,a sw es h o w
in the following example, where we omit public goods and assume a ‘very regular’ sharing
function.
Example 2 Let us consider a ﬁrst income distribution Y =(Yc,ys), such that Yc =( 1 4 ,16)
and ys =( 1 0 ,20) and the income distribution Y0=(Yc0,ys0), such that Yc0 =( 1 0 ,20) and
ys0 =( 1 4 ,16). It is easy to check, using the sequential generalized Lorenz test, that Y <AB
Y0. Assuming a perfectly egalitarian sharing function, we generate the individual income
distributions y =( 7 ,7,8,8,10,20) and y0=(5,5,10,10,14,16). These distributions are non-
comparable by the GL criterion: even under the ‘more regular’ egalitarian sharing function,
the AB criterion is not automatically converted into GL dominance at the level of individuals.
15The rationale behind this negative result can be explained in terms of principle of trans-
fers. Let us consider the income distribution Y00=(Yc00,ys00), such that Yc00 =( 1 0 ,20) and
ys00 =( 1 0 ,20). The corresponding vector of individual incomes generated by the egalitarian
sharing rule is, in this case, y00 =( 5 ,5,10,10,10,20). The distribution Y of the example
a b o v ei so b t a i n e df r o mY00 by performing a progressive transfer (of 4 units of income) within
group at the level of the more deserving group (the couples). Similarly, Y0 is obtained from
Y00 by performing the same progressive transfer among singles, that is among individuals
belonging to the less deserving group. The principle of diminishing transfers between groups
may operate, and we consistently register Y <AB Y0. Nevertheless, by reasoning in terms of
individual income distributions, we observe that y is obtained from y00 by a couple of pro-
gressive transfers (each of 2 income units) between relatively poor individuals, whereas y0 is
obtained from y00 by a sole transfer of 4 income units in the high part of the income distribu-
tion. The problem arises since, in the social dominance setup, we cannot motivate that the
ﬁrst transfer is more welfare-improving than the second one by just referring to monotonicity
and concavity of individual utility functions. The GL test appears as an inappropriate tool
when the policy-maker is concerned for inequality among individuals.
4 Testing the “Double Concavity” condition
One stake of this paper is to determine whether or not the conditions of Corollaries 1 and 2
are attainable. If the household’s public sharing function and private sharing function were
concave, then intra-household inequality could be basically ignored to compare two income
distributions. This is what is usually done up to now. In the opposite case, it would be
necessary to identify individualized incomes before implementing any income distribution
comparison.
This section presents a nonparametric test of the double concavity condition. The local-
ized version of the test can detect local non-concavity. It requires a ﬁrst step estimation of
the conditional expectancy of the public sharing function and of the private sharing func-
tion. Household public expenditures are fully observed in the data, this is not the case
16for private expenditures. Hence the concavity test of the private sharing function requires
some identiﬁcation assumptions. Individualized incomes are recovered in the spirit of Chi-
appori (1988), Browning and Chiappori (1998), Donni (2003), or Browing, Chiappori and
Lewbel (2003). However, the approach adopted here is innovative because it proposes a
nonparametric prediction of the intra-household distribution of private consumption. Tak-
ing clothes consumption as an assignable good6,t h ei d e n t i ﬁcation mechanism relies on the
inversion of single individuals’ Engel curve of clothes consumption. Because the prediction
is non-parametric, a support condition needs to be taken into account, as well as the over-
identifying restrictions implied by the observation of both spouses’ behaviour. Finally, the
endogeneity of total household expenditures has to be controlled.
The empirical part takes place in three steps. In a ﬁr s ts u b - s e c t i o n ,w ep r e s e n tt h e
nonparametric concavity test of the public sharing function. Then, sub-section 2 exposes
the prediction of individuals’ private expenditures and the assumptions required to achieve
this prediction. Sub-section 3 presents the data and sub-section 4 shows the results.
4.1 Testing the concavity of the public sharing function
Abrevaya and Jiang (2005) propose an eﬃcient and general nonparametric test of concavity
which may be used in the univariate or multivariate case. The test requires very few as-
sumptions and presents a power of rejection comparable to Elison and Elison (2000). The
test was initially developed in a context where the explanative variable is exogenous, the
generalization to the presence of endogeneity is straightforward. A fundamental assumption
of symmetry of the error disturbance must be satisﬁed. We ﬁrst present the public sharing
function, then the concavity test.
6We use the term “assignable” to designate a private good consumption observed on an individual basis.
Sometimes, clothes and shoes’ expenditures cannot be assigned in the data in which case the consumption
is included into “household’s aggregate private consumption”. Unassignable clothes consumption represents
on average 1.5% of household’s expenditures. “clothes expenditures” will always designate both clothes and
shoes expenditures.
174.1.1 The public sharing function
We consider the following nonparametric regression model:
Gi = g(Yi)+εi, where E (εi|Yi) 6=0 ,i =1 ,...,n (7)
The aim is to test the concavity between public household’s consumption, denoted by
Gi, with respect to household’s total expenditures, denoted by Yi. Hence the null hypothesis
i st h ec o n c a v i t yo ft h ef u n c t i o ng. Total household expenditures, Yi, may be correlated with
the error term εi. This is due to the simultaneity of the saving and consumption decisions,
or because household public consumption is related to the same unobserved heterogeneity
variables than household’s total expenditures. We may use total household gross income,
denoted wi, as an instrument. In the following, the individual index is omitted.
We decompose the error term into two parts:
ε = vρ+ u, with E (u|Y )=0 (8)
where vρ is a correction term for the endogeneity, v being the residual of the following
instrumental equation:
Y = wδ + ν (9)
As a consequence, equation (7) can be rewritten as the following regression:
G − vρ = g(Y )+u with E(u|Y )=0 . (10)
Provided the public expenditures term is corrected according to equation (9), this model
satisﬁes the conditions of Abrevaya and Jiang (2005) test, i.e. the expectancy of the error
term u conditionally on Y is null. Equation (10) can be rewritten in term of conditional
expectancies, this explicitates the endogeneity bias7:
g(Y )=E (G|Y ) − E (v|Y )ρ (11)
7One may remark that the shape of the endogeneity bias is assumed linear with respect to household public
expenditures. This shape is enough to induce a change in the global concavity property of the estimated g
function. For example, if d gexo(Y ) appears slightly convex, and the endogeneity induce an overevaluation of
the eﬀect of Y on G. Then the consistent estimation c giv(Y ) of the true g(Y ) function may be concave.















where K is a well-behaved quartic kernel function. The bandwidth, h, satisﬁes h− > 0 and
nh− > ∞ as n− > ∞. It is asymptotically convergent and follows a normal distribution,
which asymptotic properties are surveyed in Pagan and Ullah (1999) for example.















with e vi the empirical residual of the instrumental equation (9). Substituting conditional
expectancies by their estimations in equation (11), and replacing g(Y ) by its expression in
equation (10), gives:
G − d gexo(Y )=( e v − b v(Y ))ρ + u. (14)
The parameter b ρ follows from the OLS regression of equation (14). The null hypothesis
of exogeneity can be tested by checking the signiﬁcancy of the ρ parameter. Finally, the
consistent estimator of function g is an IV kernel estimator denoted c giv:
c giv(Y )=d gexo (Y ) − b v(Y )b ρ. (15)
Further details about this estimator may be found in Blundell, Browning and Crawford
(2003).
4.1.2 Concavity test
Theoretically, the concavity test should be applied on {Gi − ρvi,Y i}. Practically, the con-
cavity test is based on aggregated data {(c giv(Yi),Y i):i =1 ,...,n}. The test is consistent if
the distribution of the error term u is symmetric conditional on Y . The distribution of the
19error term does not need to be homosckedastic, nor normally distributed. The symmetry
property can be checked on the predicted e ui (see equation (10)):
e ui = Gi − ρe vi − c giv (Yi) (16)
We apply the nonparametric symmetry test proposed by Ahmad and Li (1997) on {e ui :
i =1 ,...,n}. Denoting fu the density function of the error disturbance, the null hypothesis























Under the null, it follows a normal distribution with null expectancy and variance S:
b S = n
−1Σ
n




In the univariate case, the mechanism of the concavity test is simple as it consists in
checking the validity of Jensen inequality for each possible 3-tuple of the sample. In our






¢−1 [# of convex 3-tuples - # of concave 3-tuples], (18)
where n i st h es a m p l es i z ea n dC3
n represents the number of 3-tuples in the sample. A
consistent bootstrap estimator of the variance, ζ, of this statistic is:
b ζ = R
−1Σ
R
r=1 (Ur − Un)
2 , (19)
where Ur denotes the proportion of convex 3-tuple in excess of concave 3-tuple, given a
ﬁx rth observation. The rth observation is randomly drawned from the original sample, R
being the number of draws. We denote U0
n the true proportion of convex 3-tuples in excess
of concave 3-tuples. The function g is globally linear if U0
n =0 , globally concave if U0
n ≤ 0
and globally convex if U0
n ≥ 0. The global version of the concavity test is directly based on





n ≤ 0,gis globally concave
H1 : U0
n ≥ 0,gis globally convex
(20)




1/2 − >N (0,1). The bivariate version of the test (U0
n =0
against U0
n 6=0 ) allows to test the linearity of the g function against global concavity or
convexity alternatives.
The global version of the test cannot reject the linearity of a function which would be
concave on a ﬁrst half and convex on a second. The localized version of the test presents
a higher power of rejection because it can detect local non-concavities. It requires the
evaluation of the Un statistic on the sample splitted into L sub-samples. Denoting g Un,l the
standardized simplex statistic evaluated at the lth location, M is the greater value taken by
the standardized simplex statistic:
M =m a x {g Un,l : l =1 ,...,L}. (21)
Intuitively, a larger value for M should give evidence against concavity. The global concavity




H0 : g is globally concave
H1 : g is locally non-concave
(22)
Under H0, a(M − b) follows a standard type I extreme value distribution, where a =
(2ln(L))
1/2 ,b=( 2l nL)
1/2 − lnlnL+ln4π
2(2lnL)1/2 . The variance of the statistic only depends on the
number of locations L. It does not depend on the standard error of the localized simplex
statistics. The test (22) is univariate, the rejection requires the M statistic to be greater
than the critical value. In case a linearity test is implemented, we would need to calculate
the statistic S which is deﬁned as:
S =m a x {|Un,l| : l =1 ,...,L}. (23)
Intuitively, a high value for S gives evidence against linearity. Further details may be found
in Abrevaya and Jiang (2005), p.7.
4.2 Testing the concavity of the private sharing function
If the amount of public goods and the private expenditures of the dominated individual
within the family is concave with respect to total household private expenditures, then
21intra-household inequality can be omitted when comparing two income distributions. Pri-
vate expenditures of individuals living in a couple are not observed in the data and should be
predicted. In this paper, the prediction cannot rely on parametric assumptions on preferences
because it must keep the marginal utility of income unspeciﬁed. Hence we propose to predict
individual private expenditures by inversing Engel curves of single individuals’ clothes ex-
penditures, after having assumed an identity of the clothes consumption pattern, for women
and for men, accross cohabitational status. Technically, this is equivalent to assume both
the Hicksian separability between clothes and other goods consumption and the identity of
the individual sub-utilities coming from clothes consumption accross cohabitational status.
Engel curves are estimated with a Nadaraya-Watson kernel estimator, controlling for en-
dogeneity of private household expenditures. The numerical inversion requires a common
support assumption. In the following we denote by the subscript j = sf,cf,sm,cm respec-
tively a single female, a female living in a couple, a single male and a male living in a couple.
The indice i of the household is omitted.
4.2.1 Clothes consumption Engel curves for single females and males
Clothes have a speciﬁc property in our analysis: it is an assignable good. For single living
individuals, the consumption of clothes of the opposite sex is extremely rare (see table (2)).
For individuals living in a couple, we are able to guess that the man consumes the whole
amount of male clothes expenditures of the family, whereas the woman consumes the whole
amount of female clothes expenditures of the family.
The Engel curve of clothes consumption of single females can be written as:
cj = f(yj)+ej, with E(ej | yj) 6=0and Va r(ef)=σ
2I, for j = sf,cf. (24)
c is the vector of clothes expenditures, f is the Engel curve of females whereas y represents
the vector of individual private expenditures8 (which are fully observed for single individuals).
It is equivalent to express the consumption in term of quantities or expenditures because
8‘Private expenditures’ for single individuals are simply total expenditures minus the expenditures which
would be considered as public in our analysis if they were in a couple (e.g. accomodation).
22the price of clothes is ﬁx in our context. As for public expenditures, private expenditures
could be endogenous to the clothes consumption process because of the simultaneity of
the consumption decisions, or because both variables are linked to the same unobserved
heterogeneity variables. This is why, generally E (ej|yj) 6=0 . We adopt the same method to
control for the endogeneity of yj than in section 3.1.1. We take w, the household gross income,
as an instrument orthogonal to the error disturbance E (ej|wj).D e n o t i n gvj the residual of
the instrumental equation (see equation 9), we may have the following augmented regression
model:
cj = f(yj)+vjρ + εj with E (εj|yj)=0 (25)
The Nadaraya-Watson IV regression estimator is detailled in section 3.1.1, it is denoted
b f(yj) and converges in probability to the true function f when h− > 0 and nh− > ∞ as
n− > ∞. In order to be inversible, the f function should be monotonic. We ensure the
monotonicity of b g by imposing a shape-restriction on the Kernel regression estimator (see
Matzkin (1994) and Mukarjee and Stern (1994)). The monotonicity-constrained estimator,
b fc is an arithmetic average of a backward b f1 and an upward b f2 estimators, its computation
has the advantage to be straightforward:
b fc(y)=




















The validity of this restriction can be locally tested by checking if the constrained estima-
tion b fc belongs to the 5% conﬁdence intervall of the unconstrained one. The same approach
is adopted for single males.
4.2.2 Prediction of individuals living in a couple’ private expenditures
We suppose that the same econometric model (equation (24)) explains clothes expenditures
across marital status. This assumption requires that preferences for clothes do not change
23when getting married. There is no doubt that this is a strong requirement. If we can deplore
the eventual presence of externalities of clothes consumption (one could care about his or
her spouse appearance), it is also likely that individual preferences for clothes, with respect
to other goods, change when getting married or when getting divorced. Another possibility
is that the marriage market selects individuals who present diﬀerent preferences for clothes
and thus can be directly or indirectly (through covariates) related to the intra-household
sharing rule. In all these cases, the prediction of the sharing rule can be biased. However,
the identity of preferences accross cohabitationnal status is a standard assumption to identify
the intra-household sharing rule (e.g. Browning et al., 2003, Couprie, 2002; Laisney, 2002;
Vermeulen, 2005). In these papers, parametric assumptions on preferences generally allow
a very delimited change in preferences because of the change of cohabitational status. In
our nonparametric approach, clothes expenditures should follow exactly the same pattern
accross cohabitational status.
We ﬁrst illustrate the prediction of female’s private expenditures. Individual private
expenditures of women living in a couple, ycf, is simulated using b f and the distribution
of the error term for singles, denoted b ψ. Let us denote f ecf a residual drawn from b ψ.I n
principle, ycf is given by the following expression:
ycf(ecf)=f
−1 (ccf − ecf), (28)
where the true Engel curve f may be replaced by the predicted one, b f,a n dt h et r u e
error term, ecf, may be replaced by f ecf. In practice, we cannot predict outside the support
of the predicted b f. Let us denote the support of predicted clothes expenditures [c,c] for the
subsample of single women, namely, c =m i nb f(yj). More precisely if the non random clothes
expenditure satisﬁes
ccf − f ecf ∈ [c,c], (29)
and if b f is monotonic, then the individual private expenditure is given by
ycf(f ecf)=b f
−1(ccf − f ecf). (30)
It may be the case that the residual f ecf is such that the support condition (29) is not sat-
isﬁed. Then in this case, we cannot predict the individual private expenditure. To overcome
24this problem, we draw several residuals for each observation. The resulting distribution is
called the distribution of replicate. Doing it uncarefully may introduce a disturbance be-
tween the genuine distribution and the replicate one. In order to prevent this shortcoming,
the number of residuals drawn is in due proportion to the fraction of non random clothes
expenditure out of the support condition (see equation (29)). A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
permits to check that the probability density function of f ecf is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent than
b ψ. In this case, the support condition is neutral on our prediction.
Applying the same method on males, we simulate private individual expenditures of
males living in a couple, ycm ( f ecm). The quality of the prediction can be checked by looking
at the adequation between the sum of the predicted private expeditures of spouses to the
household’s observed private expenditures: ycf(f ecf)+ycm ( f ecm) ≈ e Y . Male’s prediction gives
an over-identiﬁcation restriction to the model, the ratio of women expenditures is predicted
by averaging over both predictions.
4.2.3 Concavity test
The private sharing function is the relation between private expenditures of the dominated
individual and household private expenditures. The dominated individual is obtained by
taking, for each household, the minimum value of {ycf(f ecf),y cm( f ecm)}. It is then regressed
on total household private expenditures, e Y . The concavity test follows Abrevaya and Jiang
(2005), details are given in section 3.1.2.
4.3 Data
We use the French family expenditure survey namely enquête budget des familles,y e a r2 0 0 0
for the implementation of the test. This kind of data usually presents problems due to
the diﬀerent purchase frequencies of goods. To prevent this problem, two data collecting
methods are simultaneously used. The ﬁrst one is a direct interview of the household,
which aims at collecting last household’s expenditures such as rent, electricity, childcare,
etc., expenditures during the last 2 months (clothes, fuel, etc.) and some expenditures
25during the last year (service charges). Expenditures for the last two weeks are directly
recorded by individuals themselves on a small book. With this method, misreporting due
to remembering is minimized. On the counterpart, INSEE needs to control for seasonality
in the expenditures in order to construct annual expenditures for each good category. As
usual, data are collected at the household’s level and we do not explicitly know who is the
main beneﬁciary of each consumption within the household. Apart from expenditures, net
incomes, savings and socio-demographic characteristics are also collected.
[INSERTTABLE1]
Table 1 shows the sub-sampling selection process. Households containing more than two
adults without children, excluding elderly, were excluded from the analysis. This selection
rule ensures that the identiﬁcation assumptions are plausible.9 The selection tends to select
households with a lower income but with a slightly higher share of clothes consumption.
Finally, as usual, we withdraw from the sample individuals who do not consume a positive
amount of assignable clothes. This selection rule implies that households with a higher taste
for clothes or with a higher income are selected. The neutrality of this selection rule on the
analysis is assumed even if it could potentially be related to the household’s decision-making
process. One good point is that the average household’s income is nearly the same between
column 2 and 3. As shown in Table 1, individual characteristics slightly diﬀer when selecting
the sub-sample. In particular, the educational level tends to be higher, this could potentially
aﬀect (probably reduce) within household inequality.
The sample size appears small for a nonparametric analysis (461 observations for single
men, 569 for single women and 764 couples). For consistency purposes (with the theoretical
section), the analysis will not control further for the heterogeneity in clothes’ consumption
taste. Hence, nonparametric regressions will be univariate and this ensures an acceptable
9The identity of preferences for clothes accross cohabitationnal status is more likely to hold on this speciﬁc
sub-sample.
26c o n v e r g e n c er a t ee v e nw i t ht h i ss a m p l es i z e .
[INSERT TABLE2]
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics of the sub-sample. Overhall, clothes consumption
represents a relatively small share of household’s expenditures (around 5%). As the share
is low, results could be sensitive to the presence of small clothes consumption measurement
errors. Nevertheless, clothes constitutes the only assignable good disposable in the data,
Browning et al. (1994) identiﬁed the intra-household sharing rule with clothes’ demand
functions. The variation of shares between singles and couples gives an indication of the
degree of publicness or economies of scales implied by the speciﬁc good category consumption.
Indeed, expenditures related to the accommodation represent a much lower share of the
budget for couples than for singles, this probably reveals the public nature of the house.
On the contrary, the other goods do not show a decreasing share when looking at couples
instead of singles. This is the case for clothes expenditures which we can suspect to be
mainly private as the share does not change much between singles and couples (forgetting
about heterogeneity in preferences and income).T h i se x p l o r a t o r ya n a l y s i sl e a d su st oc h o o s e
a quite restrictive deﬁnition of public expenditures which are deﬁned as the expenditures
related to the accommodation (rent, heating, energy for the house).
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Intra-household sharing rule
[INSERT FIGURE2]
Figures 2a and 2b represent the Engel curve estimation of clothes consumption of single
women and single men. The conditional moment is estimated with a Nadaraya—Watson
quadratic kernel, controlling for endogeneity and constrained to monotonicity (see equation
(26)). Total household gross income is very signiﬁcant as an instrument both for women
and for men, the t-statistic equals respectively 49,4 and 35,3 for them. The exogeneity of
household private expenditures was clearly rejected in the data with a p-value lower than
270.001 for both Engel curves. Monotonicity can be tested by checking if the constrained-
estimator (the Engel curve) lies between the conﬁdence band which corresponds to the
unconstrained model. This is equivalent to a point by point testing of the monotonicity.
Globally, both the constrained curves and the unconstrained ones (see ﬁgures A1 and A2 in
appendix) are very similar and monotonicity is never rejected. Outliers were removed from
these estimations. This reduces the sample size of the predicted clothes expenditrues for
singles by approximately 10% but does not aﬀect the ﬁnal result of the monotonicity and of
the concavity test.10
[INSERT TABLE3 AND 4]
Table 3 and 4 show the results of the prediction of the private sharing function for individuals
living in a couple. We should precise that it is the ﬁr s tt i m ean o n p a r a m e t r i cp r e d i c t i o no f
the intra-household share of welfare is proposed in the literature. The prediction of female’s
private expenditures is obtained by inversing single female’s Engel curve of clothes con-
sumption using observed assignable clothes consumption of women in-a-couple. For males,
the mechanism is the same but standard error appears greater than the mean which could
reveal some prediction error, probably due to the strong identifying assumptions we used.
D e s p i t et h i s ,w ea r eq u i t ec o n ﬁdent in the predictions because all our indicators go in the
good direction. First, summing both male and female’s predictions, we obtain predicted
household private expenditures, 23000 on average, which appears not so far from observed
ones (25000). Second, the neutrality of the support condition seems to hold. This neutrality
can be checked by comparing the distributions of the predicted error disturbance for single
individuals with the one used in the simulation for individuals living in a couple. An illus-
tration is given in appendix, table A3. A formal Kolmogorov-Smirnov test can be used to
check if both distributions are statistically diﬀerent. Results indicate that the nul hypothesis
of identical distributions is not rejected, with p-value equals to 0.563 for females and 0.239
10This selection improves the quality of the graphs but does not aﬀect the relationship between the private
sharing function and household private expenditures, which remains linear. Keeping the outliers would lead
to a strong over-prediction of the average household income and would induce a non-neutrality of the support
condition.
28for males.
Finally, we can reconstitute female’s share of household’s private expenditures. It rep-
resents on average 54% of household total private expenditures. Looking at the quantiles
of this ratio, we remark that it is quite symmetrical and rarely falls below 20%. This ratio
reveals the presence of intra-household inequality which appears, with these data, most of
the time in defavor of males. This result is close to the parametric prediction obtained by
Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel (2003) on consumption data. What we are interested in
now is: how does the intra-household inequality change with household’s income?
4.4.2 Is the double concavity condition valid?
[INSERTFIGURE3 and 4]
We are looking at the concavity of the public and the private sharing functions. Figures
3 and 4 present data on the public and the private sharing function for couples, they also
show a conditional mean kernel estimation controlling for endogeneity of the explanative
variable. In both cases, exogeneity is rejected with p-values equals to 0.0077 for the public
sharing function and 0.0138 for the private sharing function. First, one should remark that
the monotonicity of the conditionnal mean is not rejected in both cases. The estimation lies
in the unconstrained conﬁdence band (see ﬁgures A.4 and 4). Second, the private sharing
function looks linear whereas the public sharng function tends to present, at ﬁrst sight, a
convex part in the middle of the graph. Then we can turn to Abrevaya and Jiang (2005)
formal concavity test.
[INSERT TABLE5]
Table 5a presents the concavity test for the public sharing function and table 5b presents
the test for the private sharing function. Data are split between 6 or 7 sub-samples in order
to eventually detect the presence of local non-convexities. Each line presents the result of
the global concavity test on the split sample, whereas the last lines of each table present the
localized global concavity test. The ﬁrst column gives the U-statistic which represents the
proportion of convex 3-tuple in excess of concave ones, the columns in the middle present
29standard-errors, p-values for the local test. The last two columns aims at checking that the
conditions of validity of the test are satisﬁed.
We start with table 5a. The local test rejects concavity for households with incomes lower
than 21000 and for households with incomes between 35000 and 42000. As a consequence, the
g l o b a lt e s tr e a l i z e do nt h ef u l ls a m p l er e j e c t sg l o b a lc o n c a v i t yo ft h ep u b l i cs h a r i n gf u n c t i o n .
If we select only households from the center of the income distribution, i.e. households with
expenditures between 14000 and 35000, the global concavity is not rejected. Looking at
the symmetry condition necessary for the test to be valid, we can notice that symmetry is
strongly rejected for very low incomes. This is probably due to the censoring of the data, this
could explain the rejection of concavity for low income households. But the p-value of the
symmetry test for households spending between 35000 and 42000 euros per year appear equal
to 0.02 which rejects symmetry of the error disturbance distribution at the 5% threshold but
n o ta tt h e1 %t h r e s h o l d .H e n c ew ec a nb ec o n ﬁdent in the rejection result of the concavity
test for these households.
For the private sharing function (table 5b), the sample was split into 6 parts. The result
of each local concavity test is clear. Local concavity is not rejected, except probably for
the [28000-35000[ window which shows a p-value of 0.024. Local linearity is never rejected,
the lowest p-value equals 0.055. The error disturbance is clearly symmetric, the symmetry
statistics is always below 1.25 in absolute value. Hence the global test concludes in favor of
the linearity of the private sharing function. This means that the intra-household level of
income does not change, on average, the balance of bargaining power within the family.
5C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
Our aim was to look if welfare comparisons made at the household level could be translated
on an individual basis. For this reason, in the ﬁrst part of the paper we ﬁnd necessary and
suﬃcient conditions on intra-household behavior that guarantees the preservation of the GL
criterion and the conversion of Bourguignon’s and A&B test. The key-properties we ﬁnd
are the convavity of the public and private sharing functions. It is not diﬃcult to show that
30Corollary 1 and 2 still hold under more general notions of individual income: for instance,
applying to the function g in Deﬁnition (2) a linear or concave transformation, diﬀerent for
each individual. In this way, we could implement diﬀerences in individual consumption of
public goods in our model. Another possible extension of our theoretical analysis could take
into account the preservation of welfare quasi-orders for populations with a diﬀerent number
of households of each size (see, among others, Jenkinks and Lambert (1993)) or focus on
poverty.
The main result of the empirical part is that the double concavity condition is rejected
for the whole income distribution but can be considered as valid in the middle of the income
distribution, excluding highest and lowest incomes. This rejection is due to a local convexity
pattern in the public sharing function and could be due to measurement errors in the extreme
of the income distribution. After having predicted the share of private expenditures going
to the female within the family (54% on average), we conclude on these data that intra-
household inequality is a relevant problem when implementing welfare comparison, notally
for a policy maker which deals with poverty analysis. On one hand, this result should be
taken carefully as the prediction relies on strong identifying assumptions. In fact, further
research should focus on relaxing them and propose a better control of the economies of
scales within families. On the other hand, focusing on a restricted domain of household
income distributions, i.e. considering only particular changes due to taxation or subsidies,
(see Peluso and Trannoy (2005)) it is possible to ﬁnd less restrictive conditions on sharing
functions that could be consistent with the empirical evidence provided here.
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Table 1: Sub-sample selection 
 
 
  All families  





Number  of  observations  9962 2750 1794 
Number of single men  1114  688  461 
Number of single women  2281  711  569 
Number  of  couples  6567 1351 764 
Household’s share of  
clothes expenditures 
   
- women  0.0197 (0.0331)  0.0219 (0.0359)  0.0302 (0.0401) 
- men  0.0155 (0.0299)  0.0181 (0.0288)  0.0259 (0.0376) 
- children  0.0094 (0.0250)  0.0002 (0.0031)  0.0003 (0.0038) 




24769.1 (16632.8)  22041.5 (14703.0)  22446.1 (14696.0) 
Household before tax  
income (in euros/year) 
28717.8 (21263.1)  25349,5 (18859.8)  25316.2 (19601.5) 
Age of household’s head  50.98 (16.74)  41.45 (12.55)  39.76  (12.51) 
Education level (1 to 5)  2.88 (1.39)  3.23 (1.44)  3.39  (1.45) 
Household has a child  0.31 (0.46)     







Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the sub-sample 
 
 
Single men  Single women  Couples 
A/ Shares of household annual expenditures (in %)    
Accommodation and energy (Public) 24.51  26.61  16.61 
Furnitures for the house  3.11  3.50  4.70 
Small furnitures for the house   5.10  4.82 
  5.81 
Car buying  3.22  3.28  6.67 
Gasoline and car-related expenditures  12.38  9.18  11.22 
Leisure 13.89  12.52  11.35 
Health and body  3.81  8.77  8.06 
Food at home  11.03  13.18  14.69 
Vices 4.41  2.59  3.18 
Clothes 5.47  5.82  5.49 
Other expenditures (bank, transfers…)  13.07  9.73  12.22 
B/ Income and expenditures (in euros/year)    
























C/ Covariates      
















Figure 1: Clothes consumption Engel Curves estimates for single individuals 
 
















































* Monotonicity-constrained regression. The 5% confidence band corresponds to unconstrained estimates. 
 














































* Monotonicity-constrained regression. The 5% confidence band corresponds to unconstrained estimates.
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Table 3: Private sharing function prediction results for couples 
 
 Mean  Standard  error  Median 
Female Private expenditures 
 (A) 10932.9  5585.1  10280.4 
Male Private expenditures 
 (B) 13141.8  15363.5  10838.1 
Household’s Private expenditures 
(C) 23022.0  8426.8  21448.8 
Female’s ratio of household’s private expenditures 
(D) 0.5469  0.2363  0.5324 
Private expenditures of the dominated  
(E) 13701.15  8377.3  12151.5 
 
 (A) Inversion of Female’s Engel curve of clothes expenditures; (B) Inversion of Male’s Engel curve of clothes expenditures; (C) Sum 
(A+B); (D) 0.5(A+Private expenditures-B)/Private expenditures; (E) (A) if (D)<0.5 and (B) if not. 
 
 
Table 4: Quantiles of female’s sharing rule 
 
Q5 Q 10 Q 25 Q 40 Q 50 Q 60 Q 75 Q 90 Q 95 
0.2090 0.2898 0.4222 0.4962 0.5324 0.5675 0.6541 0.7969 0.9498 
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* Instrumental variables Quadratic Kernel estimation 
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* Instrumental variables Quadratic Kernel estimation. 
 
39Table 5: Double concavity test 
(*) 
 






















[7607-14000[ 54  0.8444 0.1430  14.461  0.000 0.000  7.2676  0.000 
[14000-21000[ 175  0.1962 0.4367  1.9816  0.024  0.047  1.7005  0.089 
[21000-28000[ 194  -0.9424 0.0555  -78.812  1.000  0.000  0.6910  0.490 
[28000-35000[ 125  -0.9930 0.0076  -484.31  1.000  0.000  -0.1882  0.851 
[35000-42000[ 87  0.7331 0.2419  9.4227  0.000 0.000  2.2872  0.022 
[42000-70000[ 109  -0.8988 0.0654  -47.819  1.000  0.000  0.3023  0.762 
[70000-126971] 20  -0.0737 0.3379  -0.3250  0.627 0.745 -1.1397  0.254 
Global localized test    M-Stat 
(d) 
S-Stat 
(e)        
All sample  764    14.461  484.31  0.000  0.000     
[14000-35000[ 494    1.9816  484.31  0.120  0.000     
 






















[2642-14000[ 117  -0.0026  0.1434  -0.0651  0.526  0.948  0.3516  0.725 
[14000-21000[ 211  0.0039  0.1417  0.1331  0.447  0.894  -0.0253  0.980 
[21000-28000[ 169  0.0631  0.1423  1.9200  0.027  0.055  0.2728  0.785 
[28000-35000[ 91  0.0394  0.1783  0.7031  0.241 0.482  0.1279  0.898 
[35000-42000[ 65  0.0228  0.1439  0.4266  0.335 0.670  1.2489  0.212 
[42000-114233] 74  0.0749  0.1487  1.4442  0.074 0.149  0.3177  0.751 
Global localized test    M-Stat 
(d) 
S-Stat 
(e)        
All sample  727    1.9200  1.9200  0.181  0.330     
 
(*) Abrevaya and Jiang (2005). The details of the statistics and their distribution are in section 3.1.2. (a) Proportion of convex 3-tuples in excess of concave 
ones. (b) Standardized U-statistic, follows a N(0,1) under the nul: linearity or concavity. (c) Standardized I-statistic, follows a N(0,1) under the nul: symmetry 
of the error disturbance. (d) Maximum value of the standardized U-stat. (e) Maximum absolute value of the standardized U-stat. 
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Figure A.3 Cumulative distribution functions of the error disturbances before and after 

















Figure A.4 Public sharing function (monotonicity-constrained estimation) 
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